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ABSTRACT
A NO FREE LUNCH RESULT FOR OPTIMIZATION
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

By
Marisa B. Smith
August 2009

Thesis Supervised by Dr. Jeffrey Jackson
The No Free Lunch (NFL) theorems for optimization tell us that when
averaged over all possible optimization problems the performance of any two
optimization algorithms is statistically identical. This seems to imply that there are
no “general-purpose” optimization algorithms. That is, the NFL theorems show
that, mathematically, any superior performance of an optimization algorithm on one
set of problems is offset by inferior performance of that algorithm on the set of all
other problems. In this thesis we consider the seemingly negative implications of the
NFL theorems. We first extend a previous NFL theorem to get a new NFL result.
We then use ideas from probability theory and cryptography to show that if we
believe that extraordinarily small probability events will not happen, then there
exists (at least) one algorithm that is indeed a general-purpose algorithm. Thus, the
implications of the new NFL result are not as negative as expected.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of optimization is to find the “best” solution to a particular
problem. One commonly studied branch of optimization is combinatorial
optimization. In combinatorial optimization one deals with functions (problems) in
which a finite search space X maps to a finite space of cost values Y. That is, a
function f is defined as f : X 7→ Y, and the goal is to maximize (or minimize) f (x)
for x ∈ X [1]. An optimization algorithm is then some method of choosing x’s in X
in order to meet this goal. That is, it is some method of choosing x’s such that f (x)
is as large (or small) as possible for a given f .
For this paper, the performance of optimization algorithms is studied. In
particular, we are interested in whether there exist any “general-purpose”
optimization algorithms. That is, do there exist any algorithms that never do worse
than random guessing, and will do better on certain problems? The “no free lunch”
(NFL) theorems seem to imply that the answer is no. These theorems tell us that,
mathematically, if we average performance of any optimization algorithm over all
possible functions, its performance is the same as every other optimization
algorithm. So instances in which an algorithm does better than random are
necessarily offset by instances in which it does worse than random (so, on average,
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performance is the same as random guessing). From this, Wolpert and Macready
infer that there are no general-purpose optimization algorithms [2]. In this paper,
we give reason to question this inference.

1.1

Background on No Free Lunch Theorems
As mentioned previously, the “no free lunch” (NFL) theorems for

optimization are a collection of theorems that say, roughly speaking, that when
averaged over all possible problems, the performance of any pair of optimization
algorithms is statistically equivalent [2]. In other words, if one algorithm performs
better than another algorithm on one set of problems, this superior performance is
necessarily offset by inferior performance on the set of all other problems. Because
we are averaging over all possible functions, on average, the performance of the
algorithms is the same. That is, there is “no free lunch.”
The NFL theorems state that the average performance of “any pair” of
algorithms is identical, and since any pair of algorithms could include one that
randomly chooses the next point to explore in its optimization process, an
alternative way to state the NFL theorems is to say that, on average, the
performance of any optimization algorithm is no better (or worse) than random
guessing. Thus, according to the NFL theorems, when trying to find the maximum
of a function, random guessing will perform just as well on average as hill-climbing,
an algorithm which at each step examines a set of neighboring points and moves to
the one having the highest cost value (and perhaps if it becomes stuck in a local
maximum, randomly chooses a new point [3]).
Therefore, contrary to what one might expect, an algorithm such as
hill-climbing, which makes informed decisions at each step, performs, on average, no
better than an algorithm that randomly chooses its next point. In fact, perhaps
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even more counterintuitively, the NFL theorems tell us that, on average,
hill-descending, which at each step moves to the neighboring point with the lowest
cost value, performs just as well as hill-climbing when trying to find the maximum.
Although this runs counter to the fact that, in practice, hill-climbing is widely
preferred to hill-descending or random guessing if trying to find the maximum, in a
strict mathematical sense they are equivalent. The reason for this, as mentioned
earlier, is that the averaging is computed over all possible functions.

1.1.1

Some Intuition on Why the NFL Theorems Hold
To get a better understanding of why this is true, consider the following. An

optimization algorithm takes some sequence of steps to find the maximum of a
function. In particular, at each step an optimization algorithm has some fixed
method of choosing an x given a history of (x, y) pairs. However, because we are
considering all possible functions, the next x chosen could have any of the possible
y-values, regardless of how x is chosen (i.e., regardless of the algorithm). So
although for one particular function an algorithm might see a sequence of (x, y)
pairs that leads to “good values” (larger y-values), this same sequence is present in
some other function that will lead to “bad values” (smaller y-values). In fact, there
are other functions that will lead to all values in between. That is, after seeing some
initial sequence of (x, y) pairs, the next steps that an algorithm takes could lead
anywhere if all possible functions are considered. Since this is true regardless of the
algorithm, it is true of all algorithms. Thus, when one is considering all functions,
algorithm performance is the same, on average.
An alternative point of view is to picture each function as having a particular
terrain. While running an optimization algorithm on a particular function, each step
reveals more and more of the terrain. However, seeing part of the terrain tells one
nothing about the rest of the terrain if all terrains are possible (i.e., if all functions
3

are possible). For example, the part of the terrain one has seen so far might be very
smooth and level, but the rest of the terrain is just as likely to be completely
random as it is to continue to be smooth and level when one is considering all
possible functions. Thus, averaged across all possible terrains (functions), algorithm
performance is the same.
These examples of why the NFL theorems hold are merely to provide some
intuition. Section 3.2.2 contains a formal NFL theorem and proof.

1.1.2

A Particular NFL Theorem of Interest
There are a number of NFL theorems for optimization, each pertaining to

different algorithm types (e.g., deterministic or stochastic) and performance
measures. One theorem of particular interest for this paper involves what are called
choosing procedures. A choosing procedure can be thought of as a meta-algorithm
that examines the performance of two optimization algorithms after running each a
certain number of steps on an optimization problem, and based on these runs,
chooses which of the two algorithms will be used for the remainder of the problem.
Somewhat more formally, the scenario for this NFL theorem is as follows: (1) two
optimization algorithms, a and a0 , are each run m steps on a particular problem;
and (2) based on the performance of the two algorithms on these first m steps, a
choosing procedure selects which of the two algorithms to use to continue the search
(on unseen data). For this theorem, rather than averaging performance across all
problems and saying that all algorithms are equivalent, we are instead averaging
across all pairs of algorithms and saying that all choosing procedures are equivalent.
Regardless, there is still “no free lunch,” that is, mathematically, any increased
performance of a choosing procedure on one pair of algorithms is offset by reduced
performance on the remaining algorithm pairs. Similar to the theorems that seem to
imply that there are no general-purpose optimization algorithms, this theorem
4

seems to imply that there are no general-purpose choosing procedures.

1.2

Objective of the Present Study
The first result of this thesis is the proof of an NFL theorem that is an

extension of the choosing procedure situation described above. In particular, in the
original choosing procedure NFL theorem, a pair of algorithms are run a given
number of steps and based on performance on these initial steps a choosing
procedure selects an algorithm. For our new NFL result, a pair of algorithms are run
multiple times, each time with a new common starting x-value (we will call each run
a training run), and then an algorithm is selected. Also, for the original theorem,
once an algorithm is selected, performance is measured based on a continuation of
the algorithm run. For the new theorem, once an algorithm is selected, performance
is measured on a new algorithm run, starting from a new, previously unseen, starting
value (we will call this the test run). Using techniques from the proof in [2] of the
original choosing procedure situation (where each algorithm is run once), it will be
shown that for this new setting, where a set of training runs are performed, any two
choosing procedures are (still) mathematically equivalent. That is, when averaged
over all possible pairs of optimization algorithms any two choosing procedures are
equivalent in terms of the performance of their chosen algorithm on test runs.
The second result of this thesis will use a fundamental assumption of modern
cryptography to show that despite the new NFL result, there exists (at least) one
choosing procedure that is indeed better than another, in particular, better than
random guessing. More specifically, we will show that for this “better” choosing
procedure, when one of the optimization algorithms consistently outperforms the
other on sufficiently many training runs, then it is extremely unlikely that the
procedure will be “fooled” into selecting this algorithm when it is actually worse
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than the other algorithm. That is, it is extremely unlikely that one algorithm will
always perform better on many training runs but will more often than not perform
worse on a new algorithm run. We will then show that with a reasonable number of
training runs, the probability that the choosing procedure is fooled in such a way
can be made so small that it is rational to always trust the choosing procedure.
This then leads to our claim that our choosing procedure is better than a choosing
procedure that randomly selects an algorithm. This is because the choosing
procedure will not be fooled into making bad decisions, thus good performance will
not be necessarily offset by bad performance. This then means that overall the
procedure’s average performance is better than random and hence it is a
general-purpose choosing procedure.
Finally, this thesis discusses the implications of the results and how it is
possible for both to hold. In particular, the results will be related to the well-known
probability and decision theory problem, the St. Petersburg paradox, which
similarly leads to two conflicting points of view. Also, relationships to current
practice in the field of cryptography will be discussed. In doing so, it will be shown
that although in a strict mathematical sense our new NFL theorem holds, the
real-world implications are not as negative as expected.

6

Chapter 2
NFL Theorems for Optimization
In order to get to our new NFL result, it is first necessary to discuss the
original NFL theorem from which it stems. Before doing this, we need to introduce
the necessary definitions and notation that will be used.

2.1

Preliminaries
The NFL theorems are concerned with combinatorial optimization. Thus,

the search space X and the space of possible cost values Y are finite (although
perhaps quite large). An optimization problem f is a mapping from X to Y,
f : X 7→ Y, and the space of all possible problems is F = Y X .
In establishing the NFL theorems, an oracle-based model of computation is
used. In this view, during the optimization process, a particular x ∈ X is given to
an “oracle” that then returns f (x) = y ∈ Y for the given optimization problem
f ∈ F. Performance is then evaluated based on the results produced from a certain
number of function evaluations (calls to the oracle).
When performing an optimization problem, the set of function evaluations is
called the sample. If m function evaluations are performed, then the sample is
denoted dm ≡ {(dxm (1), dym (1)), . . . , (dxm (m), dym (m))}, where dxm (i) is the ith
7

(time-ordered) search point in the sample and dym (i) is its corresponding cost value.
Also, dxm ≡ {dxm (1), . . . , dxm (m)} is the ordered set of m points in the search space
that have been explored, and dym ≡ {dym (1), . . . , dym (m)} is the associated set of cost
values. An important note here is that only distinct function evaluations are
counted in these sets. That is, revisits are not counted as evaluations. This is
because revisits complicate algorithm comparisons and can be easily avoided [2].
An optimization algorithm is a mapping from a previously visited (ordered)
set of points to a single new (previously unvisited) point in X . More formally,
a : d ∈ D 7→ {x|x ∈
/ dx }, where D ≡ ∪m≥0 Dm is the set of all samples of arbitrary
size and Dm = (X × Y)m is the space of all samples of size m. Note that by the
definition above, an optimization algorithm is deterministic (although Wolpert and
Macready show in [2] that NFL results apply to stochastic algorithms as well).
As previously mentioned, we are using an oracle-based model of
computation. Thus, algorithm performance is measured by some function of dym , the
set of cost values after m iterations of the algorithm. A performance measure will be
indicated by Φ(dym ) to reflect this relationship.
As an example, when trying to find the maximum of a function f , an
appropriate performance measure might be the largest cost value (y-value) in dym ,
Φ(dym ) : maxi {dym (i) : i = 1, 2, . . . , m}. Another (perhaps better) way to evaluate
algorithm performance that considers all elements in dym , and does not “reward” an
algorithm that happens to stumble upon one lucky guess, is to use the histogram of
cost values. This histogram, denoted ~c, is defined as follows:

~c = (cY1 , cY2 , . . . , cY|Y| )
where cYi is the number of times the cost value Yi occurs in dym . Note that this
histogram (or vector) has one component for each possible y ∈ Y, thus there are a
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total of |Y| components. We can then apply some function that maps ~c to a
“goodness” measure. That is, we apply some function that takes the histogram of
cost values ~c and outputs some sort of ranking of how good this histogram is. For
example, we could use Φ(~c) : ~c 7→ R where larger values in R indicate a better
ranking. We can then use this ranking as our performance measure. Note that this
is just one possibility for Φ(~c).

2.2

Choosing Procedure NFL Theorem

2.2.1

Definitions
The above definitions and notation are used to develop a framework for all of

the NFL theorems presented in [2]. However, a few additional definitions are
necessary that are specific to the choosing procedure NFL theorem introduced
earlier. An obvious addition is the need for the definition of a choosing procedure.
From [2]:

Definition 1 (Choosing Procedure - Wolpert and Macready). A choosing
procedure is a rule that examines the samples, d and d0 , each of size m, which result
from running algorithms a and a0 , respectively, m steps on some f ∈ F. Based on
these samples, the choosing procedure then decides which algorithm, a or a0 , to use
on the subsequent part of the search of f .

Also, for this particular NFL theorem, because we are comparing the
choosing procedures, and not the algorithms, it is necessary to define a slightly
different measure of performance. Remember that for the choosing procedure NFL
theorem, we are saying that any two choosing procedures are equivalent. Thus, we
are interested in what happens after a choosing procedure makes its choice. That is,
9

if the goal is to find the maximum, did the choosing procedure make a “good”
decision and choose the algorithm that leads to larger cost values, or did the
choosing procedure make a “poor” decision and choose the algorithm that leads to
small cost values? The question of which choosing procedure made the better
decision (and chose the better algorithm) is answered by comparing where each of
the algorithms would explore after the initial m iterations. In other words, we are
interested in d>m , the samples of the function that come after using the choosing
algorithm. Thus, a performance measure of interest is Φ(~c>m ), the rank (goodness)
of the histogram of cost values that comes after the initial m sample points (i.e.,
after the choosing procedure has made its choice).

2.2.2

Statement of Theorem
Now that we have all of the necessary framework in place, from [2], the NFL

theorem involving choosing procedures is as follows:

Theorem 1 (Choosing Procedure NFL Theorem - Wolpert and Macready). Let d
and d0 be two fixed samples of size m, that are generated when the algorithms a and
a0 , respectively, are run on the (arbitrary) cost function f at hand. Let A and B be
two different choosing procedures. Let k be the number of elements in ~c>m . Then
X

P (~c>m |f, d, d0 , k, a, a0 , A) =

a,a0

X

P (~c>m |f, d, d0 , k, a, a0 , B)

a,a0

where the sum is over all algorithms a consistent with d and a0 consistent with d0
and P (~c>m | . . .) is the probability that a certain histogram ~c>m is produced for the
given parameters.
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An immediate result of this theorem is that

Pa,a0 (~c>m |f, d, d0 , k, a, a0 , A) = Pa,a0 (~c>m |f, d, d0 , k, a, a0 , B).

That is, for fixed f , d, d0 , and k, once a choosing procedure has made its choice, the
probability, over uniform random choice of a and a0 consistent with d and d0 , of
seeing a particular histogram of y-values, ~c>m , is independent of the choosing
procedure. To see that this is the case, assuming that the choosing procedure is A,
P
notice that Pa,a0 (~c>m |f, d, d0 , k, a, a0 , A) is just a,a0 P (~c>m |f, d, d0 , k, a, a0 , A) divided
by the number of (a, a0 ) pairs consistent with d and d0 . Since the number of (a, a0 )
pairs consistent with d and d0 does not depend on the choosing procedure, and we
P
showed in Theorem 1 that a,a0 P (~c>m |f, d, d0 , k, a, a0 , A) is independent of the
choosing procedure, then Pa,a0 (~c>m |f, d, d0 , k, a, a0 , A) does not depend on the
choosing procedure either. Thus, when considering all algorithms a consistent with
d and a0 consistent with d0 , the probability, over choice of a and a0 consistent with d
and d0 , of seeing a certain set of y-values is unaffected by the particular choosing
procedure. Since the probability of ~c>m is unchanged by the particular choosing
procedure, the performance of the procedure Φ(~c>m ) is also unchanged. Thus, the
performance of all choosing procedures is equivalent.
For a detailed proof of Theorem 1 see [2]. However, worthy of mention here is
that the proof relies on a certain restriction of where the algorithms can search after
the initial m iterations. In particular, once a choosing procedure is selected, the
chosen algorithm is not allowed to return to any points in d∪ ≡ dm ∪ d0m . More
accurately, it can return to these points, but as explained before, these points are
not counted. This may seem a strange restriction because, in essence, it prevents
one algorithm from visiting any of the points that the other algorithm has already
visited. As we will see, no such restriction is necessary in the new NFL result.
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Chapter 3
Extending the Choosing Procedure
NFL Theorem
3.1

Description of Scenario
The new NFL result, presented in this paper, is an extension to the choosing

procedure theorem described in the previous chapter. The NFL theorem from [2]
involved choosing procedures that make their decisions based on performance on one
run each of a pair of optimization algorithms. Also, once a decision has been made,
performance is measured based on a continuation of one of the algorithm runs. For
the new NFL theorem, the choosing procedures instead choose based on
performance on multiple runs (a training set of runs) of a pair of algorithms, and
once a choice has been made, performance is measured on a new algorithm run,
starting from a new, before unseen, initial x-value.
Somewhat more formally, the choosing procedures examine the performance
of two algorithms, a and a0 , on a set of N algorithm runs on some function f ∈ F,
where the initial x-values for each run are chosen uniformly at random. Then, based
on this performance, a choosing procedure decides which algorithm, a or a0 , to use

12

on a new algorithm run, with initial x-value again chosen uniformly at random,
however with the restriction that only a starting x-value not already seen before will
be accepted. As the following theorem and proof will show, given this setting, any
two choosing procedures are statistically equivalent.

3.2
3.2.1

New NFL Result
Additional Definitions
Before presenting our new result, we will first provide a slightly different

definition for a choosing procedure since we now are making a decision based on a
set of algorithm runs rather than on a single run. Also, we will explicitly include in
our definition the possibility that a choosing procedure is randomized. This allows
us to include a random choosing procedure in our subsequent analysis. The
definition for a choosing procedure is as follows:

Definition 2 (Choosing Procedure). A choosing procedure is a rule that examines
the samples, d1 , d2 , ..., dN and d01 , d02 , ..., d0N , each of size m, which result from
running algorithms a and a0 , respectively, N times on some f ∈ F, where the initial
x-value for each run is chosen uniformly at random; call these values x1 , x2 , . . . , xN .
Based on these samples, the choosing procedure then decides which algorithm, a or
a0 , to use on the (N + 1)th algorithm run on f , where the starting x-value, xN +1 , for
this run is again chosen uniformly at random, but with the restriction that
xN +1 ∈
/ {x1 , x2 , . . . , xN }. The choosing procedure can also elect to ignore the samples
and randomly choose between a and a0 , with some fixed probability γ of choosing a
and probability 1 − γ of choosing a0 .

Also, we need to refine our definition of an algorithm since we are now
13

randomly choosing its initial x-value. Recall that the previous definition of an
algorithm says that it chooses its own starting value: a : d ∈ D 7→ {x|x ∈
/ dx }, where
D ≡ ∪m≥0 Dm is the set of all samples of arbitrary size and Dm = (X × Y)m is the
space of all samples of size m. That an algorithm chooses its starting value is
reflected in the fact that m can equal 0. For our new definition, we still want an
algorithm to be defined as a mapping from a set of visited points to a new,
previously unvisited, point. However, we need to reflect that we are choosing the
algorithm’s starting value. We can accomplish this by simply redefining D as
D ≡ ∪m≥1 Dm , and leaving the definition of an algorithm as a : d ∈ D 7→ {x|x ∈
/ dx }.

3.2.2

Theorem and Proof
Now that an introduction to the scenario has been presented and we have

redefined a choosing procedure and an algorithm to fit this scenario, a formal
statement of the theorem and proof (which is an adaptation of Wolpert and
Macready’s proof of Theorem 1) are as follows:

Theorem 2 (New Choosing Procedure NFL Theorem). Let d1 , d2 , ..., dN and
d01 , d02 , ..., d0N be fixed samples, each of size m, that are generated when two
algorithms a and a0 , respectively, are run N times on an (arbitrary) fixed function
f ∈ F, where the initial x-value for each run is drawn uniformly at random; call
these values x1 , x2 , . . . , xN . Let A and B be two different choosing procedures. Let
xN +1 be the starting value for the (N + 1)th algorithm run on f , where xN +1 is
again chosen uniformly at random, but with the restriction that
xN +1 ∈
/ {x1 , x2 , . . . , xN }. Let m also be the number of elements in ~c>m·N , where
~c>m·N is defined as the histogram of cost values that results after running the chosen
algorithm until it has visited m distinct points. Then
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X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A)

a,a0

=

X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , B)

a,a0

where the sum is over all algorithms a consistent with d1 , d2 , ..., dN and a0 consistent
with d01 , d02 , ..., d0N .

Proof. Let proc represent A or B. For deterministic choosing procedures, for fixed
d1, d2 , . . . , dN and d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , proc’s choice of a or a0 is fixed. So, throughout the
summation, a choosing procedure consistently chooses a or consistently chooses a0
because it makes its choice based on d1 , d2 , . . . , dN and d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , and not on the
particular algorithms at hand. This leaves us with two possible situations: 1. if proc
chooses a; or 2. if proc chooses a0 .
If proc chooses a for our d1 , d2 , . . . , dN and d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N then we have

X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1, d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , proc)

a,a0

=

X X
a0


P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a)

a

where a0 can be dropped from P (~c>m·N | . . .) because ~c>m·N is set by a if a is chosen,
and proc can be dropped because of its consistent choosing of a. Also, we can break
our original (single) summation into two because fixing an a0 and then an a gives
the same result as picking an (a, a0 ) pair since we are summing over all possible valid
combinations of a and a0 (i.e., all a and a0 consistent with the data).
If proc chooses a0 for our d1 , d2 , . . . , dN and d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N then we have

15

X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , proc)

a,a0

=

XX
a

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a0 )



a0

where a and proc can be dropped and the summation can be broken into two for
reasons analogous to above.
Starting with the inner summations on each of the right-hand sides, by the
definitions of ~c>m·N and xN +1 , on the (N + 1)th runs of a and a0 , neither algorithm
has seen a sample of length m with initial x-value xN +1 . That is, neither algorithm
has seen the set of data that results when using the initial x-value xN +1 on their
algorithm. To see that this is the case, recall that the definition of an algorithm is a
mapping from a previously visited (ordered) set of points to a single new (previously
unvisited) point in X . So each step that an algorithm takes depends on the ordered
set of previous steps it has taken. Because we have never started a and a0 with an
initial x-value of xN +1 , the algorithms are unconstrained. That is, the algorithms
are not forced into taking the same steps they previously took on one of the runs in
the training set. So, despite the fact that the algorithms have already been run N
times on f , what the algorithms do on the (N + 1)th run (i.e., the test run) is
independent of what they did the first N times (i.e., independent of the samples
d1 , d2 , . . . , dN and d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N that came from running the algorithms a and a0 ,
respectively, the first N times). Thus, both algorithms are free to visit any possible
sequence of m x-values beginning with xN +1 . Therefore, the inner summations in
the above equations are equal because they both sum over the same set of
possibilities for ~c>m·N .
Because P (~c>m·N | . . . , a) has no dependence on a0 and P (~c>m·N | . . . , a0 ) has
no dependence on a, in order to show that the overall sums of the right-hand sides
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of the equations are equal, we only need to show that each outer summation is
added up the same number of times. That is, the number of possible a’s and the
number of possible a0 ’s is the same. To see that this is true, notice that in our
summation we are implicitly summing over those a and a0 that could result in
d1 , d2 , . . . , dN and d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N respectively when run on f . Before the first runs of
the optimization algorithms on f , both a and a0 could come from the set of all
possible algorithms. Then, as each set of algorithm runs is performed, each set of
data points d1 , d2 , . . . , dN and d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N puts constraints on which algorithms a
and a0 could be. However, each set of points puts the same number and kind of
constraints on both a and a0 . That is, each knocks out N (or some number less than
N if any of the xi for i = 1, 2, . . . , N are the same) sequences of m initial values. So
it does not matter what the data is, the same number of algorithms are taken out of
consideration as a possible algorithm at each step. Thus, after the N runs of the
optimization algorithm, the number of a’s consistent with d1 , d2 , . . . , dN and the
number of a0 ’s consistent with d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N is the same. Therefore, the number of
times that each outer summation is added is the same.
Thus, the overall sums are equal because for the inner summations a is
summed over a set of values and a0 is summed over (essentially) the same set, and
the number of summands is equal in both cases. Another way to view this is to
notice that we essentially have a change of variables, where although the order of
summation may be different, each sum involves the same set of possible x values,
which in turn will result in the same set of probability values, P (~c>m·N | . . .), being
added. And again, because the number of outer summations is the same, this set of
probability values is being added the same number of times. Thus, regardless of
what proc does, the sums are the same.
Letting C equal the number of times the outer summation is summed, and
assuming, without loss of generality, that proc chooses a, we can rewrite our sum as
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X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , proc)

a,a0

=C·

X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a).

a

This sum is independent of proc, which in turn allows us to say that the sum
for choosing procedure A is equal to the sum for choosing procedure B, or more
precisely

X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A)

a,a0

=

X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , B).

a,a0

Note that in the proof of this theorem choosing procedures A and B are
assumed to be deterministic. This is reflected in our claim that for fixed samples
d1, d2 , . . . , dN and d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N a choosing procedure’s choice of a or a0 is fixed.
Since our definition of a choosing procedure also allows for a form of randomization
in which the samples are ignored and an algorithm is randomly selected, we need to
extend Theorem 2 with the following corollary.

Corollary 1. For randomized choosing procedures A and B, and for
~c>m·N , f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, and a0 as defined in Theorem 2,
X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A)

a,a0

=

X

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , B).

a,a0

18

Proof. For a fixed setting of the parameters (f , d’s, d0 ’s, etc.), a randomized
choosing procedure R is going to choose a with some probability γ and a0 with some
probability (1 − γ). So for a fixed a and a0 , P (~c>m·N | . . . , R) is γ for the ~c>m·N
produced by a, (1 − γ) for the ~c>m·N produced by a0 , and 0 for all other histograms
~c>m·N . Let A be the procedure that always chooses a and let A0 be the procedure
that always chooses a0 . Then summing P (~c>m·N | . . . , R) over all (a, a0 ) pairs, you get
γ times the sum of the probabilities P (~c>m·N | . . . , A) and (1 − γ) times the sum of
the probabilities P (~c>m·N | . . . , A0 ). However, since A and A0 are deterministic, the
proof of Theorem 2 gives you that the sum of the probabilities P (~c>m·N | . . . , A)
equals the sum of the probabilities P (~c>m·N | . . . , A0 ). Therefore,
X

P (~c>m·N | . . . , A) + (1 − γ) ·

X

a,a0

a,a0

X

P (~c>m·N | . . . , A) + (1 − γ) ·

X

P (~c>m·N | . . . , R) = γ ·

X

= γ·

a,a0

a,a0

=

X

P (~c>m·N | . . . , A0 )
P (~c>m·N | . . . , A)

a,a0

P (~c>m·N | . . . , A).

a,a0

Thus, Theorem 2 can be extended to show that there is still no free lunch for
randomized choosing procedures. An immediate result of this theorem (and
corollary) is that

Pa,a0 (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A)
= Pa,a0 (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , B).
That is, for fixed f , xN +1 , d’s, d0 ’s, and m, the probability over uniform random
choice of a and a0 of seeing a particular histogram of y-values, ~c>m·N , is independent
of the choosing procedure. In other words, when considering all algorithms a
consistent with the d’s and a0 consistent with the d0 ’s, the probability, over uniform
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choice of a and a0 consistent with the d’s and d0 ’s, of seeing any particular set of
y-values does not depend on the choosing procedure. Thus, when averaging across
all pairs of algorithms consistent with the data, all choosing procedures are
equivalent.
Theorem 2 leads to the following corollary:

Corollary 2. Given Theorem 2, the following holds:

Ea,a0 ,xN +1 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A]
= Ea,a0 ,xN +1 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , B]
where the expectation is over the uniform random choice of starting point xN +1 and
uniform random choice of a and a0 consistent with the training data, and A and B
are any two choosing procedures.

Proof. To see that this is true, assume A is the choosing procedure. For fixed
f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , and m, the expected value, over all possible
(a, a0 ) pairs consistent with the data, of the goodness of a histogram, Φ(~c>m·N ),
given we are using choosing procedure A, is just the sum, over all possible
histograms ~c>m·N , of the goodness of that histogram times the probability over a
and a0 of obtaining the histogram given A. That is,

Ea,a0 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A]

=

X

Φ(~c>m·N ) · Pa,a0 (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A).

~c>m·N

This probability, Pa,a0 (~c>m·N | . . . , a, a0 , A), is just the sum over a and a0 of
P (~c>m·N | . . . , a, a0 , A) divided by the number of (a, a0 ) pairs consistent with
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d1 , d2 , . . . , dN and d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N . We will use #(a, a0 ) to denote this number. Thus
we have

Ea,a0 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A]
X

=

P
Φ(~c>m·N ) ·

~c>m·N

a,a0

P (~c>m·N |f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A)
.
#(a, a0 )

In Theorem 2 we showed that

P

a,a0

P (~c>m·N | . . . , a, a0 , A) is independent of the

choosing procedure. Since no other terms involve A, the choosing procedure, we get
that Ea,a0 [Φ(~c>m·N )| . . . , a, a0 , A] is also independent of the choosing procedure.
Thus we have

Ea,a0 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A]
= Ea,a0 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , B] .
To complete the proof, we need to take the expected value over xN +1 as well. By
definition of expected value, we have

Ea,a0 ,xN +1 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A]

=

X

Ea,a0 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A] · P (xN +1 ).

xN +1

The only term which involves the choosing procedure A is
Ea,a0 [Φ(~c>m·N )| . . . , xN +1 , a, a0 , A] which we have already shown is independent of
the choosing procedure. Thus

Ea,a0 ,xN +1 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , A]
= Ea,a0 ,xN +1 [Φ(~c>m·N )|f, xN +1 , d1 , d2 , . . . , dN , d01 , d02 , . . . , d0N , m, a, a0 , B] .
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This corollary says that for any fixed training data, the expected performance
of all choosing procedures is identical when averaged over all possible unseen starting
points and over all optimization algorithms consistent with the data. This would
seem to imply that no choosing procedure can have expected performance—over
choice of starting point and algorithms—better than a random choosing procedure.
Also, from this result, Wolpert and Macready would claim that regardless of
f , if we make no assumptions about how a and a0 are chosen, then we cannot be
sure that any particular choosing procedure will perform better than a random
choosing procedure when the test point is chosen at random from the set of unseen
starting points. This in turn implies that, barring assumptions about the
optimization algorithms and/or f , there is no theoretical justification for using any
particular choosing procedure. In the next chapter we will show that this is not
necessarily the case.
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Chapter 4
A Superior Choosing Procedure
One of the conclusions that might be drawn from Theorem 2 is that there are
no “superior” choosing procedures. This is because this theorem tells us that,
mathematically, “good” performance is offset by “bad” performance, so on average
no choosing procedure is any better than any other choosing procedure. Put another
way, this result implies that no choosing procedure is superior to a procedure that
randomly selects an algorithm because instances in which a choosing procedure does
better than random are seemingly offset by instances in which it does worse than
random.
Using probability theory in conjunction with principles from standard
cryptographic practice we will show that instances in which a choosing procedure
does better than random do not necessarily have to be offset by instances in which it
does worse than random. More specifically, we will present an example of a choosing
procedure that, if provided with a sufficient (yet reasonable) number of training
runs, we should rationally believe performs at least as well as and sometimes better
than a random choosing procedure. That is, we should rationally believe that, on
average, the performance of this choosing procedure is superior to a random chooser
and thus it can be classified as a general-purpose choosing procedure.
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4.1

Description of Choosing Procedure
This “superior” choosing procedure makes its choice as follows: if one of a

pair of algorithms outperforms the other on all algorithm runs in the training set,
then choose this algorithm; otherwise, randomly choose between the two algorithms,
where each algorithm is chosen with probability 1/2. We will refer to this choosing
procedure as the unanimous choosing procedure since it only really makes a decision
if one algorithm always outperforms the other one (i.e., when there is unanimous
support for one of the algorithms). In Section 4.2.5 a formal definition will be
provided.

4.2

Why the Procedure Is Superior
In order to show that the unanimous choosing procedure is superior we must

determine the “sufficient, yet reasonable” number of training runs that are necessary
to claim that the procedure will perform better than random choosing, on average.
First we will provide some intuition as to why a sufficiently large training set allows
us to make such a claim. The intuition is as follows. If one algorithm consistently
outperforms the other for all N runs in the training set, then, using standard
probability theory, we can show that the probability that the unanimous choosing
procedure will be fooled into thinking that this algorithm is better (when in reality
the other algorithm is better) becomes increasingly small as N grows. If we can say
that the probability that our choosing procedure is fooled in such a way is so
small—perhaps around 2−128 small—that we can rationally believe that it will not
happen, this allows us to say that our choosing procedure is better than random
guessing. This is because, on one set of possible test runs, when one algorithm does
not consistently outperform the other during the training runs, our choosing
procedure reduces to random guessing. On the other set of possible test runs, when
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one algorithm consistently does better, then it is overwhelmingly likely, and thus
rational for us to believe, that on average the algorithm that it chooses performs
better on the test run. So, on one set of runs our choosing procedure does as well as
random, and on the other set we can rationally believe that it does better than
random. This allows us to say that, on average, our choosing procedure is better
that random guessing, or alternatively, that it is a general-purpose choosing
procedure.

4.2.1

Prediction Error of a Choosing Procedure
Using a somewhat more precise argument, notice that when a random

choosing procedure selects an algorithm, then with probability 1/2 this choice is
correct, that is, the chosen algorithm will perform better on the test run, and with
with probability 1/2 this choice is incorrect. Thus, we will say that a random
choosing procedure’s prediction error is 1/2.
For the unanimous choosing procedure, when one algorithm does not
consistently outperform the other, then it randomly selects an algorithm. From the
preceding discussion, we see that when this happens its prediction error is 1/2.
When one algorithm does consistently outperform the other and the number of
times that it does so is sufficiently large, then we can show that it is rational to
believe that the prediction error is less than 1/2. Thus, averaged over unseen
starting values, it is rational to believe that the prediction error of the unanimous
choosing procedure is less than 1/2.
The NFL result of Chapter 3 seems to imply that the expected prediction
error is exactly 1/2 for all choosing procedures. Thus, if we can show that it is
rational to believe that the expected prediction error of the unanimous choosing
procedure is less than 1/2, then we can say that the implications of the NFL
theorem are not as negative as expected.
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4.2.2

A Sufficient Training Set
Now that we have some intuition on why a sufficiently large training set

allows us to claim that our choosing procedure is superior to random guessing, we
can start to pin down an an appropriate value for N . We can do this using standard
probability theory.
As previously discussed, when the unanimous choosing procedure selects an
algorithm (i.e., does not randomly choose) we need the prediction error to be less
than 1/2 in order to claim this procedure is better than random. That is, when the
procedure makes a choice, the probability over unseen starting values that the
chosen algorithm loses, or performs worse than the other algorithm, must be less
than 1/2. Using standard probability theory we can present a situation in which it
is overwhelmingly likely that a certain classification error c holds, where
classification error is the probability over all possible starting values that the chosen
algorithm performs worse using the starting value. As we will show in Section 4.2.3,
we can then use this classification error to calculate the prediction error.
Since we can show it is extremely likely that a particular classification error
c holds, let us fix this value to c = 0.24. This way, even if the prediction error is
double the classification error we still have p = 0.48 < 21 . As we will show in Section
4.2.3, if the number of training runs is less than 12 |X | this is a fitting assumption.
We can now begin to calculate a training set size N such that it is overwhelmingly
likely, and thus rational to believe, that the classification error is at most 0.24 (and
after some calculations, that the prediction error is at most 0.48).
This argument is as follows. If the probability is at least 0.24 that the chosen
algorithm loses (i.e., the classification error is at least 0.24), then on one training run
the probability that the unanimous choosing procedure does not pick the “losing”
algorithm, or alternatively, the probability that it fails to detect a loss is at most
1 − 0.24 = 0.76. On N training runs, the probability that it fails to detect any losses
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is at most (1 − 0.24)N = (0.76)N . This is because training runs are independent, so
we can simply multiply the probabilities. Thus, on the (N + 1)th run or the test run
of the algorithms, the probability that the unanimous choosing procedure is “fooled”
by the randomized choice of starting values in the training set into thinking that one
algorithm is better 76% of the time (because it did not detect any losses during the
training runs) and thus is “fooled” into choosing this algorithm is at most (0.76)N . If
we set this value, (0.76)N , less than some extraordinarily small value δ > 0 and solve
for N , then it is extremely unlikely that the unanimous choosing procedure will be
fooled by the N training runs into choosing the algorithm that will perform worse
on the test run. In fact, in Section 4.2.6 we claim that if the probability that it is
fooled is less than δ, then it is rational for us to believe that it will never be fooled.
Thus, if we encounter a situation in which one algorithm consistently wins (for a
sufficient number of training runs), then it must be the case that we are not being
fooled but instead happen to have a “nice” function that is not completely random
or happen to have algorithms that can truly distinguish themselves which means
that we should trust the selection that the choosing procedures makes.
In order to solve for the sufficient training set size N such that it is
extremely unlikely that the unanimous choosing procedure is fooled into making an
incorrect choice, we will set the extraordinarily small value δ to 2−σ , where for the
time being and for concreteness we will use σ = 128. That is, we will use
δ = 2−σ = 2−128 . As we will see in Section 4.2.7, the reason for choosing this as our
δ and in particular for choosing 128 as our σ is related to standard cryptographic
practice. For now we will just note that 2−128 is an extraordinarily small probability.
In order to find a sufficient training set size N such that (0.76)N < δ we can
m
l
use the following formula from [4]: N ≥ 1c ln( 1δ ) . Note that (0.76)N is actually
just (1 − c )N , so c = 0.24. To verify that this formula is correct and to see why
values of N that satisfy this inequality are appropriate, we use the fact that
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(1 − n1 )n <

1
e

1
n

for n > 0. If we substitute c in for
1

1

1

ln( 1δ ) this becomes (1 − c )( c )(ln δ ) < ( 1e )ln δ =

1
1
δ

and raise both sides to the power

= δ. Thus, if we set N at least as

large as ( 1c )(ln 1δ ), we get (1 − c )N < δ. So for c = 0.24 and δ = 2−128 , we have
l
m 

1
1
1
1
ln(
)
= 0.24
ln( 2−128
) = 370. Thus, when the unanimous choosing procedure
c
δ
makes a choice, that is, does not randomly pick an algorithm, values of N greater
than or equal to 370 will allow us to produce an algorithm choice that with
probability (1 − 2−128 ) will lose at most 24% of the time (i.e., have classification
error at most 0.24).
Notice that this says that the classification error is at most 0.24. That is,
0.24 is the probability, taken over all x ∈ X , that the unanimous choosing procedure
selects the losing algorithm when using starting value x. This means that x’s seen
during the training runs are used in the calculation of this probability. We are
interested in how the choosing procedure performs on xN +1 ∈
/ {x1 , x2 , . . . , xN }, or
how it performs on unseen x, so we are interested in the prediction error. In the
next section we will show how to use classification error to calculate prediction error.

4.2.3

From Classification to Prediction Error
We can calculate the prediction error from the classification error as follows.

If the classification error rate of the unanimous choosing procedure, when it selects
an algorithm, is 0.24, then it makes at most 0.24 · |X | errors on the entire space X .
If we have seen some fraction α of the possible starting x-values, then even if all of
the errors are on unseen starting values, the prediction error rate p is at most
(number of errors)/(number of unseen inputs) =
bound of

0.24
1−α

0.24·|X |
(1−α)·|X |

=

0.24
.
1−α

So we now have a

on the prediction error rate.

In order to show that the overall prediction error rate of the unanimous
choosing procedure is less than 1/2, and thus better than what Theorem 2 would
seem to imply, we need the prediction error when a choice is made to be less than
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1/2. Thus, we need to solve for α to determine the allowable fraction of seen
starting values such that this prediction error is less than 1/2. That is, we need to
solve

0.24
1−α

<

1
2

for α. Doing this, we see that α must be less than 0.52, so in order to

ensure a prediction error of less than 1/2 we must limit the number of seen starting
values to approximately 12 |X |. Note that in practice it highly unlikely that we will
sample half of the search space because |X | is typically very large.
From these calculations it should now be clear why a classification error of
0.24 was chosen. This is because if we limit the number of seen inputs to 1/2 of the
search space, then the prediction error is

0.24
1−α

=

0.24
1− 12

= 0.48 which is less than 1/2.

A classification error of even 0.25 would yield a prediction error of 0.5 which is not
less than 1/2 and thus would not allow us to claim that the unanimous choosing
procedure is better. Also, note that the prediction error we have calculated holds for
the same N and with the same probability that the classification error holds, that is,
it holds with probability 1 − 2−128 for N = 370.

4.2.4

A General-Purpose Choosing Procedure
Throughout this paper we have alternately discussed our choosing procedure

as being better than random and as being a general-purpose choosing procedure.
We will now provide a formal definition for a general-purpose choosing procedure
which will more precisely describe what we mean by “general-purpose.” Also, from
this definition it should be clear that when we say a choosing procedure is a
general-purpose choosing procedure this means that it is better than a random
chooser.

Definition 3 (General-Purpose Choosing Procedure). A choosing procedure P is a
general-purpose choosing procedure if every time it is executed on some fixed
function f , the probability over unseen starting values U ≡ X − {x1 , x2 , . . . , xN } that
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the algorithm selected by P performs worse than the algorithm that was not selected
is less than or equal to 1/2 and sometimes strictly less than 1/2. That is, its
prediction error p is less than or equal to 1/2, and in some cases is strictly less
than 1/2.

Note that in this definition we are saying that there exist situations where p
is strictly less than 1/2. In Section 4.2.9 we will provide one such situation. Also
note that from this definition it should be clear that a general-purpose choosing
procedure is better than random. This is because a random chooser always has
p = 1/2; however, as we have already stated, there are instances in which a
general-purpose choosing procedure has p < 1/2. Thus, the average prediction error
of a general-purpose choosing procedure will be less than 1/2, and thus better than
random guessing. Finally, we use the term “general-purpose” because every time the
procedure is executed the probability that the selected algorithm performs worse is
at most 1/2 (and sometimes less). So no matter when we use it, it will perform at
least as well as and sometimes better than random. Thus, we can consider it to be
“general-purpose.”

4.2.5

The Unanimous Choosing Procedure
Now that we have the necessary framework in place, we can finally give a

formal definition of the unanimous choosing procedure. This will then allow us to
formalize our argument that this procedure is better than random and is a
general-purpose choosing procedure.

Definition 4 (Unanimous Choosing Procedure). The unanimous choosing
procedure is a choosing procedure that runs the algorithms a and a0 on a sufficient
number of training set starting x-values, N , such that the probability over choice of
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starting values S = {x1 , x2 , . . . , xN } that either a is correct on every xi or a0 is
correct on every xi and yet the procedure has classification error greater than 0.24 is
at most 2−σ . Once the sufficient number of training runs is performed, the procedure
then makes its choice as follows. If a is perfectly correct on S or a0 is perfectly
correct on S and N ≤ 12 |X |, it selects a or a0 , respectively; otherwise it randomly
chooses between a and a0 , where each algorithm has probability 1/2 of being chosen.

Note that in the above definition the choosing procedure will only make a
choice if one algorithm always wins and if it has seen at most 1/2 of all possible
initial x-values. This is indicated by the restriction of N to N ≤ 21 |X |. As
previously mentioned, given that the classification error c is 0.24 we must limit the
fraction of seen inputs to 1/2 in order to ensure that the prediction error p is at
most 2 · 0.24 = 0.48, which is less than 1/2.

4.2.6

Choosing Procedures and Rationality
Now that we have a more formal definition of the unanimous choosing

procedure, we can discuss why it is rational to always trust that its prediction error
is less than 1/2. Using terminology similar to [5], we define a class T C of
trustworthy choosing procedures as follows:

Definition 5 (Trustworthy Class of Choosing Procedures). A choosing procedure P
is in the class T C if for every execution of P (regardless of f, xN +1 , m, a, a0 , N, d’s,
and d0 ’s), the probability, over uniform random choice of initial x-values from U ,
that the prediction error rate exceeds 1/2 is at most 2−σ .

As previously noted, based on standard cryptographic practice, we will use
σ = 128 in defining our sufficiently small probability. We now make the following
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claim:

Claim 1. If choosing procedure P is in the class T C, then P is a general-purpose
choosing procedure. That is, every time P is executed its prediction error will be at
most 1/2 and for some problem parameters will be less than 1/2.

Thus we are claiming that δ = 2−σ = 2−128 is such an extraordinarily small
number that the prediction error of the choosing procedure will be at most 1/2.
That is, we are no longer saying that with probability (1 − δ) the prediction error
rate will be at most 1/2, we are instead saying that we are convinced that the
prediction error rate will be at most 1/2. Thus, δ = 2−128 is such a small probability
that we can safely ignore it, or put another way, the probability that the procedure
is fooled by the randomized choice of starting values into choosing the wrong
algorithm is so small it should be ignored.
This leads to the following rational belief. If we believe Claim 1 (i.e., if we
believe that a probability of 2−128 is sufficiently small that it is negligible, which
cryptographic practice would lead us to believe), then we should trust that the
prediction error of the unanimous choosing procedure is at most 1/2 and sometimes
less.

4.2.7

Cryptographic Practice and Rationality
As mentioned several times previously, the basis of our using 2−128 as an

appropriately small probability comes from standard cryptographic practice. As
shown in [6] and [7], the current recommendation of the National Security Agency
(NSA) of the United States Government is to use the Advanced Encryption System
cryptographic algorithm with 128-bit keys (AES-128) to encrypt classified
documents. For our purposes, the details of how AES-128 works are unimportant.
32

What is important however is that the algorithm relies on the belief that the
probability is 2−128 that a single random guess of a key will decrypt an encrypted
document. As Jackson and Tamon mention in [5], even if the same key was used to
encrypt every classified document and a billion documents were encrypted per
second for a billion years, if we systematically guessed and checked distinct keys for
each document, the probability of any of these guesses succeeding would be less
than 1 in 10 trillion.
It is unlikely that the national government would go about encrypting
classified documents with AES-128 if they knew it was possible to “break” the
algorithm in any reasonable amount of time. Thus, it is implicit that the NSA and
hence cryptographic experts believe that it is rational to trust that any document
encrypted using AES-128 will not be broken by a limited number of guesses, even
though there is an extremely small probability that this could occur for any given
document. Or put another way, they feel that it is rational to believe that
real-world events that have an extraordinarily small probability of occurring will not
occur, even though mathematically we cannot rule out their possibility [5].
Before moving on, we note that in our definitions we used 2−σ rather that the
fixed value of 2−128 . This allows us to adjust our sufficiently small probability to
changes in standard cryptographic practice. Thus, if 128 bits of security is no longer
considered sufficient to protect classified documents, then we can simply adjust σ to
be some larger value that is acceptable.
Now that we have shown how the extraordinarily small probability of 2−σ
was chosen, we assert that if it is rational to trust that the current cryptographic
standards used to encrypt classified documents are secure, then it is rational to
believe Claim 1. That is, if we believe that AES-128 will not be broken, then we
should believe that every time the unanimous choosing procedure is run the
prediction error will be at most 1/2 and in some cases less than 1/2.
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4.2.8

A Trustworthy Choosing Procedure
Now that we have given some arguments for why Claim 1 should be

accepted, we will subsequently use it to show that there are indeed positive results
regarding the ability of the unanimous choosing procedure without the need for any
assumptions about what the function f , starting value xN +1 , or algorithms a and a0
consistent with the data are. In particular, we will show that the unanimous
choosing procedure is in the class T C. Thus, we should trust that its prediction
error rate truly is less than or equal to 1/2 and sometimes strictly less than 1/2.

Theorem 3. The unanimous choosing procedure is in T C.

Proof. By its definition the unanimous choosing procedure either randomly chooses
between a and a0 , each with probability 1/2, or it makes a choice of a or a0 . When it
randomly chooses the prediction error rate is always 1/2. This is because, by
definition, the random choice has probability 1/2 of picking a and probability 1/2 of
picking a0 . Thus, when a random choice is made (with probability 1) we have an
error rate of 1/2. When the choosing procedure makes a choice, that is selects a or
selects a0 , then (by its definition) with probability at least 1 − 2−σ the prediction
error is less than of equal to and some times strictly less than 1/2 . Thus, overall,
with probability at least 1 − 2−σ , the unanimous choosing procedure’s prediction
error is at most 1/2 and sometimes less meaning it is in T C.

This leads immediately to the following corollary:

Corollary 3. If Claim 1 is accepted, then the unanimous choosing procedure is a
general-purpose choosing procedure.
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Before giving these results we stated that we make no assumptions about f ,
xN +1 , or the algorithms a and a0 that the unanimous choosing procedure uses.
However, Corollary 2 in Section 3.2.2 tells us that if we make no assumptions about
what xN +1 , a, and a0 are, then
Ea,a0 ,xN +1 [Φ(~c>m·N )| . . . , a, a0 , A] = Ea,a0 ,xN +1 [Φ(~c>m·N )| . . . , a, a0 , B] ,

where the expectations are over the uniform random choice of starting value xN +1
and algorithms a and a0 consistent with the training data, and A and B are any two
choosing procedures. Thus, the expected performance over uniform random choice
of xN +1 , a, and a0 is independent of the choosing procedure. So the NFL result
seems to imply (and the pioneer of the NFL theorems David H. Wolpert would say)
that if we do not make some assumption about f , xN +1 , a and a0 , then no choosing
procedure is any better than a random chooser. That is, we must be making some
assumption about f or about how xN +1 , a, and a0 are chosen—they cannot be
chosen uniformly—if we have a choosing procedure that does better than random
choosing.
However we are saying that our choosing procedure does better than random
choosing and we make no assumptions about the function f , the starting x-value
xN +1 , or about the algorithms a and a0 that the unanimous choosing procedure uses.
That is, regardless of f and regardless of the xN +1 , a, and a0 that we pick, the
unanimous choosing procedure does better than random choosing. Thus, despite the
seemingly negative implications of the NFL theorems, if we believe Claim 1, then
the actual ramifications are not quite so negative.
Note that we are not saying that the unanimous choosing procedure is
necessarily a “good” choosing procedure, we are just saying that it is better than a
random chooser. That is, its average prediction error is better than 1/2. This is
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because if we ever have the case that one algorithm always outperforms the other,
then it is rational to believe that the unanimous choosing procedure will pick the
algorithm that performs better, on average, on test runs (i.e., it will choose the
correct algorithm). So on one set of possible runs, when the unanimous choosing
procedure actually picks an algorithm, the prediction error is at most 1/2 (and
sometimes strictly less than 1/2), and on the other set of possible runs, when it
randomly chooses an algorithm, its prediction error is exactly 1/2. So, on average,
the prediction error of the unanimous choosing procedure is better than 1/2.
Thus, despite the NFL result proven in Section 3.2.2 which tells us that, on
average, the prediction error of a choosing procedure is 1/2, if we believe Claim 1,
then we can show that there does exist (at least) one choosing procedure (i.e., the
unanimous choosing procedure) such that, on average, its prediction error is better
than 1/2. Therefore, the implications of the NFL theorems are not as negative as
expected.
Note that this statement relies on our belief in Claim 1, which we already
argued in support of in Sections 4.2.6 and 4.2.7. It also relies on the fact that it is
possible that one algorithm could always outperform the other algorithm. Thus at
some point we could have a prediction error of less than 1/2 which means that the
average prediction error is also less than 1/2. We will now show one possible
scenario in which one algorithm would always outperform the other algorithm.

4.2.9

Scenario in Which One Algorithm Is Consistently
Better
One possible situation where one algorithm would always outperform the

other is as follows. Recall that Φ(~c>m·N ) is our performance measure. One possible
Φ that would give non-trivial results (i.e., the unanimous choosing procedure would
make a choice) would be one that looks at the final y-value of a training run and
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outputs 1 if this value is above a certain threshold and 0 otherwise. If used in
conjunction with a convex function f (or a “bowl terrain”) which takes on integer
values from, say, 0 to 100, then our threshold might be something like 50. If
algorithm a is some kind of hill-climber and algorithm a0 is some kind of
hill-descender, and assuming neighboring points in f differ in their y-value by at
most 1, and assuming that every point except those at the bottom and top of the
“bowl” have higher and lower neighbors, then if we run both algorithms for, say, 51
steps, then Φ will produce values of 1 for the histograms of a and it will produce
values of 0 for the histograms of a0 .
This shows that it is not unreasonable to believe that one algorithm could
outperform the other algorithm on all N training runs. Thus, there are situations in
which the unanimous choosing procedure will actually make a choice, and our
previous claims are not merely vacuously true.

4.2.10

A Caveat

One possible caveat in showing that it is rational to believe that the
unanimous choosing procedure is better than random is that our chosen extremely
small probability δ = 2−σ = 2−128 may not be small enough in certain situations.
For example, if we use choosing procedures to pick between algorithms 2128 times,
then it is very likely that during one of these uses a choosing procedure was fooled.
This means that a probability of 2−128 will not be sufficient. Thus, the rate at which
choosing procedures are used as compared to our chosen extremely small probability
has a very important effect on whether this probability is “small enough.”
Note however that we left open the possibility that the σ we use could be
larger than 128. In fact, increasing σ by 1 means the rate at which choosing
procedures are run would have to double in order for 2−σ to again not be small
enough. As it is, it is probably safe to say that choosing procedures are not run at
37

such a high rate that we should worry about our probability not being sufficiently
small. If this were a concern though we could increase σ to a large enough number
such that it is no longer a concern. Also, this potential problem is not unique to
running choosing procedures. The same problem would occur in cryptography if
decryption algorithms were run at an extremely high rate. Decryption algorithms
are almost certainly run more often than choosing procedures, so if it is found that
128 bits of security is no longer sufficient in cryptography, then we can simply
change our σ to an appropriately large value (that is sufficient for cryptographic
security) as necessary.

4.3

Comparison to Work on the St. Petersburg
Paradox
The apparent paradox that the results of this paper make is not a novel

discovery. In fact, there is a similar paradox between mathematical probabilities and
rational beliefs in a centuries old problem called the St. Petersburg paradox.
The St. Petersburg paradox comes about from a gambling game in which a
fair coin is flipped until it comes up tails (see [8]). If a tail comes up on the first flip,
there is a payout of $2. If a tail does not come up until the second flip, then there is
a payout $4. And in general if a tail does not come up until the kth flip, then there
is a payout of $2k . Thus, it is easily shown (see, e.g., [5]) that the expected payout
of the game is arbitrarily large. Note that one possible reason this paradox occurs is
because extremely low probability events, such as flipping a coin 128 times before a
tail comes up, are used in calculating the expected payout.
With this arbitrarily large (in fact, infinite) expected payout, the question is
then, how much should someone be willing to pay to play this game? According to
[9], few people would pay even $25 to play this game. That is, even though standard
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probability theory tells us that any finite amount of money is an appropriate
amount to pay, most rational people would not even pay $25. Thus, standard
probability theory does not always provide a good model of rational real-world
behavior [5]. This is similar to our paradox in which standard probability theory
tells us to infer from the NFL theorems for optimization that general-purpose
choosing procedures do not exist; but if it is rational to believe that extraordinarily
small probability events will not happen, then we can show that it is possible to
“break out” of these negative results.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
5.1

Conclusion
As we have already shown, standard cryptographic practice indicates that

extremely low probability events, such as decrypting a document encrypted using
AES-128 with a limited number of guesses, are thought to have such an
extraordinarily small chance of occurring that it is rational to believe that they will
not occur. If we believe that this is true, then we can show that there exists (at
least) one choosing procedure—the unanimous choosing procedure—that, on
average, is better than random choosing and hence is a general-purpose choosing
procedure. This is despite Theorem 2 which shows that, on average, the
performance of any two choosing procedures is mathematically equivalent. This
leads us to the conclusion that despite the seemingly negative results of our NFL
theorem, the implications are not as negative as expected.

5.2

Future Work
One of the limitations in showing that the unanimous choosing procedure is

superior to random guessing is that during the training runs one of the algorithms
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always had to win in order for it to not randomly choose between the algorithms.
That is, even if an algorithm tied sometimes, but still never lost, this algorithm was
not chosen and instead an algorithm was randomly chosen. The reason for this is
that once ties are allowed, the analysis becomes more complex. That is, we probably
would not want to choose an algorithm if it won only once and then tied every other
time; however, we might want to choose it if it tied once and won every other time.
Thus some criteria for determining an appropriate cut-off for an allowable
percentage of ties should be investigated.
Another, somewhat related, limitation is that in order to find a superior
choosing procedure one of the algorithms always had to win. That is, the superior
choosing procedure had to be the unanimous choosing procedure. In the future,
some analysis of the implications of not requiring one algorithm to always win
should be explored. For example, should we trust that our choosing procedure is
better if it wins on 75% of the training runs? What about only 51%? Answers to
these questions will give us a better understanding of when we should trust that a
choosing procedure is correct in its decision.
Finally, similar to the NFL theorems for optimization, there are also NFL
theorems for machine learning which show that any two learning algorithms are
statistically equivalent (see [10]). Also, in [5], arguments analogous to those used in
this paper show that there exist several general-purpose learning algorithms. Thus,
the implications of the NFL theorems for machine learning are also not as negative
as expected. It may be beneficial to combine these analyses.
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